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Introduction 
Cross-governmental planning and coordinating policies are among the main 
challenges for sustainable, low carbon development. Why is sustainable 
development planning so ineffective? How can governments plan and coordinate 
public policy interventions more effectively? What can we learn from theory and 
experience in other democracies about effective cross-governmental planning? 
Answering these questions is necessary to improve sustainable development 
planning processes. This paper reviews the literature on sustainable development 
planning and analyzes the South Africa’s recent national planning efforts. 
Evidence shows that recent efforts emphasize repeated planning and strategizing 
with difficulties in the actual implementation. The reason for this is a 
combination of lack of information in policy to overcome uncertainties in the 
planning process and a lack of political commitment and equivalent institutions.  
South Africa has a number of development plans and sectorial strategies 
for sustainable development. The first integrated framework for sustainable 
development emerged after the Johannesburg Summit in 2002. An independent 
National Planning Commission presented the latest development plan in 2011. 
Furthermore, the departments produce their own development plans and 
strategies. These efforts have had no major positive impacts on reducing poverty, 
emissions and inequality. Income inequality remains among the highest in the 
world. 39% of the population lives below the national income poverty line. South 
Africa’s greenhouse gas emissions constitute around 1% of global emissions. For 
a developing country, South Africa’s annual per capita emissions are high, at 9.2 
tons per capita, whereas its GDP per capita is closer to developing countries with 
far lower emissions per capita. The emissions-intensity of the South African 
economy is one of the highest in the world. 
This paper serves as a background document for a research project that 
informs sustainable development planning through the analysis of developmental 
impacts of mitigation action. 
Background: Theories on sustainable development planning  
The literature provides some answers to the research questions. Why is 
sustainable development planning so ineffective? How can governments plan and 
                                               




coordinate public policy interventions more effectively? What can we learn from 
theory and experience in other democracies about effective cross-governmental 
planning? These answers come mostly from the planning and political science 
literature. The groundwork has identified three main conflicts between the 
economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable development 
(WCED 1987; Campbell 1996). These three conflicts are a resource conflict 
between economic development and environmental protections, a development 
conflict between environmental protection and equity and social justice, as well 
as a property conflict between economic development and equity (Campbell 
1996). The conceptualization of sustainable development has some impact on 
solving these conflicts (Campbell 1996; Connelly 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Three main conflicts for sustainable development planning 
                      
Source: Campbell 1996 
Early writers in the political sciences in the 1970s criticized the actual ambition of 
policy planning, as ‘planners cannot be consistent’ and ‘adapt to changing 
circumstances’ at the same time (Wildavsky 1973; Meadowcroft 1997). Another 
critique states that ‘one big integrated implemented solution for environmental 
decay’ or ‘an actually operative development plan for a developing country’ are 
simply not possible (Lindblom 1979, 521 cit in Meadowcroft 1997).  
Later perspectives on ‘new governance’ change from the question of 
whether planning is possible to how planning can be done. The new governance 
perspective suggests that planning occurs in interactive policy networks, which 
are driven by ‘trust and cooperation’ (Rhodes 1996 cit in Meadowcroft, 1997) as 
well as hierarchy and conflict, and a certain network logic, which determines the 
interactions and bargains (Marin and Mayntz 1991; Mayntz 1997). This ratio 
does not always follow the logic of the market and determines the success of the 
negotiations. Network theories have not actually provided an explanation yet, 
why sustainable development strategies are inefficient. Yet, they are helpful to 









identify actors and interests involved in the development conflicts. The third 
perspective contributes in a similar way. The approach suggests that advocacy 
coalitions negotiate policy solutions within given frameworks according to 
interests and beliefs. These processes trigger policy learning (Sabatier 1988; 
Weible, Sabatier et al. 2009) and lesson drawing (Rose 1991; Rose 2005) between 
the coalitions and countries. The negotiations between these coalitions determine 
the outcome in the planning process.  
We can conclude that none of these theories suggest any concrete 
solutions of how to make sustainable development planning more efficient. They 
rather explain the ‘open-ended’ nature and problems of sustainable development 
planning, which ‘is a complex and ambitious objective’ (Meadowcroft 1997). 
Further literature provides some insights on the constraints to successful 
sustainable development planning, which are uncertainty, information and policy 
coordination. 
UNCERTAINTY 
Uncertainty appears as a key problem for sustainable development planning 
(Meadowcroft 1997; Jaenicke and Joergens 2000). Jaenicke and Joergens (2000) 
argue that strategic environmental planning can reduce uncertainties, in the 
prognosis of environmental changes, impacts of action and non-action, political 
uncertainty and innovation. The authors identify three empirical characteristics of 
sustainable development plans, which are usually only a first step for coherent 
sustainable development strategies. The three categories are firstly the ‘accuracy 
and relevance of the […] goals’, secondly the ‘degree of participation and 
integration of the planning process’ and thirdly the ‘extent of institutionalization 
of the plan’ (Jaenicke and Joergens 2000). These three categories reoccur in other 
work in other words.  
An evaluation of 30 sustainable development plans finds that it does not 
actually make a difference for the integration of sustainability principles whether 
they are explicitly mentioned in the plans. It rather matters whether the goals are 
well specified. The authors make the case that the planning stage needs to be 
carefully assessed along implementation and outcomes (Berke and Conroy 2000). 
Further literature emphasizes the role of indicators for developing quantifiable 
goals, which can be monitored and evaluated (Briassoulis 2010). 
DEMOCRACY 
The uncertainties and its open-ended nature make sustainable development 
planning a difficult task for both developed and developing societies. The 
literature identified most of the hurdles to sustainable development planning on 
the basis of empirical evidence from developed countries. Most of the evidence 
comes from the OECD countries (Meadowcroft 1997; Berke and Conroy 2000; 
Jaenicke and Joergens 2000; OECD 2009). OECD countries are mostly mature 
democracies with respective institutions. Many developing countries still lack 
those institutions, checks and balances and unconstrained flow of information. 
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Therefore, it is important to better understand sustainable development planning 
in developing democracies. An OECD study identifies political commitment, 
policy coordination mechanisms and monitoring systems as the key ‘building 
blocks for policy coherence for development’. Commitment and coordination 
relate to the degree of participation and institutionalization. Again, stating clear 
policy goals, create formal inter-ministerial committees, and devote sufficient 
resources are key ingredients for successful planning and implementation (OECD 
2009).  
The argument that development comes first, and democracy later, 
prevailed for a long time in the literature. However, experiences show that 
democracy centered development strategies work better because they promote 
political checks and balances, responsiveness to citizen priorities, openness and 
information flow. Poverty often prevails in undemocratic political structures, 
without active citizenship, transparent institutions and participation (Siegle, 
Weinstein et al. 2004). Interestingly, researchers found that democracies have 
more rigorous environmental policies than autocratic regimes (Fredriksson and 
Wollscheid 2007). Does this mean that the sustainable development planning 
processes in democracies are more efficient? The literature on democracy and 
development suggests that this would be the case, given the better access to 
information and openness (Siegle, Weinstein et al. 2004), growth-enhancing 
policies and redistribution (Sahli and Bolle 2007).  
INFORMATION 
One way to overcome the uncertainties in sustainable development 
planning is informed policy making. The research literature on evidence-based 
policy- making (EBP) shows that scientific research can increase the effectiveness 
in the policy making process. In environmental policy making, EBP has especially 
in increasing the quality of information as the basis for decision-making, 
involving stakeholders, increasing transparency and evaluation (Holmes and 
Clark 2008). EBP can also help to better inform policy transfer between countries, 
because it is better informed and policies are better evaluated (Legrand 2012). 
EBP has been criticized, especially in education policy (Sanderson 2003). It is 
certainly no silver bullet to overcome the uncertainties in sustainable 
development planning, as evidence needs to be interpreted carefully. However, 
research on the potential impacts of policy choices on the development goals, 
such as poverty and emissions reductions, can help to inform those choices, 
increase their legitimacy and transparency. Yet, the link between evidence and 






Framework for analysis: Uncertainty, democracy and information 
The framework presents uncertainty, democracy and information as the three 
main challenges to sustainable development planning from the research literature. 
The framework aims to contribute to a better understanding of the inefficiencies 
in the sustainable development planning process in order to overcome them.  
Figure 2: Key challenges for efficient sustainable development planning 
                          
       Source: own compilation  
The relationship between these three challenges helps to define efficient 
sustainable development planning, which is a process embedded into 
coordinated democratic institutions and subject to political commitment. Free 
information flow and scientific evidence help to overcome the uncertainties in 
understanding the resource, development and ownership conflicts, help to 
define realistic and feasible development goals and make the implementation, 
monitoring and implementation of the plan easier.  
Table 1: Overview of the characteristics to the key challenges in the research literature  
UNCERTAINTY DEMOCRACY INFORMATION 
Environmental changes 
and their impacts 
Institutional structure for 
planning 
Inform quantifiable and 
reachable goals 
Impacts of policy 
intervention and non-
intervention  
Non-committal plans, lacking a 
strong basis in law 
Understand possible 
impacts of intervention and 
non-intervention  
Policy uncertainty Institutionalized obligation of 
regular progress reports  
Inform on trade offs and 
opportunity costs 
Innovation  Mechanisms for evaluating and 
reformulating the proposed 
targets and measures  
Support priority setting  
Open-ended process  Lack of recurrent process of 
policy learning,  
Interdepartmental policy 
coordination  
the scientific analysis of 
environmental changes 
has great weight in the 
plans 
Overall outcome  Advanced environmental policy 
plans  go hand in hand with an 
increase in diagnostic capacities 
Free information flow and 
access in democracies 
Implementation Maintain responsibility over a 
longer period of time  
Monitoring and evaluation, 
support implementation 





   Sustainable Development Planning in a democratic South Africa  
Sustainable development planning is a very recent exercise in South Africa, 
which has been strongly internationally influenced. In 1992, during the Rio 
Summit, South Africa was not yet a member of the United Nations, again. The 
negotiations for the transition from an apartheid driven minority regime to 
democratic rule were still underway at that time. Since the first democratic 
elections in 1994, the South African government undertook two main cross-
governmental planning exercises, which supposedly combined the sectorial 
planning efforts. The first is the National Framework for Sustainable 
Development; the second is the National Development Plan, which will be 
analyzed in this section according to the framework below.   
DEMOCRACY, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICY UNCERTAINTY 
After the transition, the new South African government caught up quickly on the 
international stages. Ten years after Rio’s Earth Summit that introduced the 
concept into the national agendas, South Africa hosted the anniversary summit in 
Johannesburg in 2002. The commitments at the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg were full of good intentions. The 
Johannesburg Declaration restated the government’s commitment to sustainable 
development. The Johannesburg Plan of Implementation compiles a long list that 
repeated old targets and added 37 new targets and time frames. The range of 
topics is diverse and reaches from halving the number of people without access to 
sanitation by 2015 to a global science and technology agenda.  
Furthermore, nations committed to themselves to develop national 
sustainable development strategies besides the Agenda 21 by 2005 in Paragraph 
162 of the JPOI: 
“States should take immediate steps to make progress in the formulation and elaboration of 
national strategies for sustainable development and begin their implementation by 2005.” 
This commitment became a challenging task for the Department of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT) at the time. The department led the 
efforts to develop this cross-governmental strategy. Yet, the department was small 
in terms of budget and staff and lacked the necessary power for such an umbrella 
function. The weak institutional setup of the strategy jeopardized the success for 
implementation from the beginning of the planning process. The process started 
in 2003. In 2005, the first draft of a ‘National Framework for Sustainable 
Development’ came out for public comment. In 2008, the NFSD past the 
Parliament and became an official government document. ‘People, Planet and 
Prosperity’ titles the National Framework for Sustainable Development (NFSD). 
The process carried on with a new draft in 2010 that is supposed to set targets 
until 2014. Until 2009, the NFSD was the only explicit sustainable development 
strategy. It received the careful name ‘framework’ rather than ‘development plan’. 
The NFSD built a framework for other macroeconomic development plans and 
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never received the priority that it deserved as a planning tool. The 
implementation strategy and action plan followed in 2010.  
The NFSD resulted from an international initiative, as opposed to a 
national priority. Institutionally, it was based in a minor, second range 
Department, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, which has no enforcement 
power over the other ministries. Implementation became impossible without a 
strong political commitment from the presidency, despite the DEAT’s big efforts 
in developing the strategy.  
National planning regained priority with the new administration in 2009. 
President Zuma reemphasized the importance of national planning asking to 
think about ‘the story’ of how South Africa overcame poverty, mass 
unemployment and inequality. The former Minister of Finance, Trevor Manuel, 
received the mandate to set up a national planning commission (NPC) to create a 
long-term development plan for South Africa. The NPC received the status of a 
ministry, and was set up as a part of the presidency. Twenty-four experts from 
different fields became commissioners. Their task was to develop a vision in their 
field until 2030, with short-term, mid-term and long-term objectives and actions. 
The commission presented the first draft of National Development Plan for South 
Africa for public comment in November 2011 and finalized it in August 2012.  
The institutional setup of the planning commission as a ministry under the 
presidency is an improvement compared to the NSFD, because it acts at a higher 
level independently from a single department. Policy uncertainties derive from 
the fact that there is no legislation, which makes the plan a valid public policy. 
The plan will probably never turned into an act, a bill, a green or a white paper. 
Absence of clear political commitment makes the implementation of the plan 
uncertain. A further indication for lacking political commitment is that most of 
the funds for the planning process came from the British development aid, rather 
than a national budget.  
Further uncertainties derive from the directorship of the semi-independent 
commission. The commission consists mostly of independent, non- governmental 
experts, but it is headed two political heavyweights in the ANC, Trevor Manuel 
and Cyril Ramaphosa. Both stand for political fractions within the party. The 
planning commission is very much associated mostly with Manuel, which 
increases the political uncertainty of the commission depending on the future of 
his political career.  
DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND POLICY PROBLEMS  
Many South Africa’s sustainable, low-carbon development goals hide in diverse 
sectorial plans. The South African government has formulated these targets 
implicitly in its recent development plan and its National Response White Paper 
on Climate Change. In 2009, President Zuma announced to ‘implement 
mitigations actions that will collectively result in a 34% and a 42% deviation 
below its „Business As Usual‟ emissions growth trajectory by 2020 and 2025 
respectively.’ Yet, this outcome depends on the extent of financial, capacity-
 8 
building, technology development and technology transfer support to developing 
countries in accordance with Article 4.7 of the UNFCCC.1 Mitigation actions 
have become key to advance emissions reductions. The White Paper restated 
these numbers, which Cabinet approved. Mitigation actions are the main vehicle 
to achieve the emissions reduction, however, they are not clearly defined yet. As 
in most developing countries, development comes first on the political agenda in 
South Africa. Therefore, mitigation actions need to be in line with the 
development priorities, and cannot tackle poverty and inequality just as a 
desirable ‘co-benefit’. 
Similarly, development targets are clearly quantified, but unclear how they 
will be achieved yet. The National Planning Commission prioritized to reduce 
poverty and inequalities as the main development objective in its national 
development plan. By 2030, the number of 39% of the population living below 
the national poverty line (418 ZAR per month/ 2009 prices) should be reduced to 
0%. Income inequality (as measured in GINI) should decrease form 0.7 to 0.6 by 
2030 (NPC 2011, p.3). Yet, it is not clear how these targets will be achieved. The 
targets for poverty and inequality reduction in the national development plan are 
not national policy (yet). The implementation strategy plan in 2010 of the NFSD 
states the main problems that South Africa faces: job losses through the global 
economic crisis, rising emissions, water scarcity, rising food prices, rising oil 
prices globally and a domestic electricity crisis.  
Implicit development targets appear in other policy plans: The new growth 
path (NGP), the industrial policy action plan (IPAP), the integrated resource plan 
(IRP) underpinned by a 10-year plan for scientific and technological development. 
The NGP and the IPAP plans acknowledge poverty and inequality as the main 
challenges that need to be overcome. The targets, however, do not quantify 
reductions in poverty and inequality. Quantifiable targets refer to unemployment 
rates and new jobs. The NGP set a target to create five million new jobs, to reduce 
unemployment from 25% percent (in 2010) to 15% in 2020. The plan targets 300 
000 jobs to explicitly emerge in the ‘green economy’ with 80 000 in 
manufacturing and the rest in construction and maintenance of ‘environmentally 
friendly infrastructure’. The NGP estimates the potential for job creation in this 
sector with 400 000 until 2030 (RSA 2010b). These green jobs are supposed to 
emerge around natural resource management, renewable energy construction and 
manufacturing. The plan underpins this objective with a comprehensive support 
for renewable energy and energy efficiency. The main target is to create 5 million 
new jobs by 2020 to reduce unemployment from 25% to 15%. The plan geared up 
to 2011, the designated year of job creation under the Zuma administration.  
                                               
1 This reduction is calculated in the logic that emissions “peak, plateau and decline”. The 
emissions supposedly peak between 2020 and 2025 in a range between 398 megatons and 583 – 
614 megatons. More details on the logic of the fictional reductions can be found in the 
document DEA (2011) Defining South Africa’s Peak, Plateau and Decline Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trajectory.  The emissions reductions targets were first announced in 2009 by 
President Zuma and restated in the National Climate Change Response White Paper in 2011.  
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In the NGP, the mining sector plays an important role for job creation. 
The mining sector shrank by 1% per year during the commodity boom between 
2001 and 2008, whereas in other mining driven export countries these sectors 
grew about 5%. In South Africa, these numbers caused heated debates between 
mining industry and the government about the causes. Mining firms 
representatives argue that it is a consequence of governmental intervention, 
whereas government sees it as their duty to structurally support these businesses.  
The mining sector implies key development, property and resource 
conflicts. The exploitation of coal and metals fuel the export economy as well as 
most of the national electricity supply. Strong trade unions, COSATU and NUMSA, 
protect the jobs in the mining sectors and bring forth many successful ANC 
politicians. The strong historical bond between the ANC, the unions and the 
communist party is very much centered around the mining sector and its voting 
workers, although it is intrinsically driven by the property conflicts between social 
equity and economic development.  
A growing mining industry generates jobs, yet does not contribute to 
reducing emissions and protecting water resources. The resource conflict unfolds 
in the coal dependency of the electricity sector, which demands a growing mining 
sector. Therefore, the government aims at exploring new coalmines in the 
Waterberg area, as the resources in the central mining fields are fading. These 
endeavors require major infrastructural investments, mostly on railways, roads 
and ports. These large-scale public works again create jobs, especially for lower 
skilled labor. These jobs are not necessarily sustainable. Once the main road 
works are done, only a small part remains employed in maintenance and 
administration.  
Different studies provide different impacts. The ILO claims that the 
community based work program has created 140 000 jobs of which 19 000 were 
sustainable with a financial input of 85 million rand. There is a problem with low-
skilled labor-intensive jobs for public works, because government can’t 
legitimately build underpaid slave labor programs. Training education and 
prospective higher skilled employment needs to be integrated in the public works 
programs. Monitoring and evaluation has so far not been an integral part of the 
NPWP.  
South Africa has experiences with big public infrastructure projects that 
were supposed to create jobs since the 1980s. The public works programs between 
1980 and 1994 were unsuccessful according to the analysts because they created 
little sustainable employment, were not cost-efficient and did not deliver long 
term results (McChuetcheon 2010, Maasdorp et al. 1994). The National Public 
Works program became a key component of the RDP in 1995. The main idea was 
to reduce unemployment through ‘productive and labor intensive jobs’, education 
and training, community empowerment, sustainability and planning, monitoring 
and evaluation. 15 years later, large public infrastructural works, again, feature 
high on the political agenda and in the recent development plan.  
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In his state of the union speech in February 2012, President Zuma 
declared the year 2012 as the year of infrastructure delivery. Last year was the 
year for job creation. The unemployment rate has dropped in the first quarter in 
2012. Zuma interpreted this trend as an immediate outcome of his political efforts 
throughout 2011. Zuma identified ‘the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty 
and inequality persists, despite the progress made. Africans, women and the 
youth continue to suffer most from this challenge’ (Zuma, State of the Nation 
Speech 2012). 
The Industrial Action Plan (RSA 2010a) suggests concrete intervention for 
sustainable, low carbon development. These interventions suggest increases in the 
content of local manufacturing in Solar Water Heating (SWH), and the renewable 
energy procurement program for independent power producers (IPPPP). These 
industrial policy programs target to increase local manufacturing around solar 
and wind technology within South Africa.  
Furthermore, the plan suggests stimulating demand for biofuels through 
mandatory biodiesel and bioethanol blending at 5% and 2%. The Department of 
Energy plans to finalize this intervention for approval by the end of 2012. The 
Department made plans to set up a biofuel plant, which is controversial, because 
there are almost no skills in this area. The Department of Trade and Industry 
spends two third of its annual budget on incentives. The budget grew almost 
doubled between 2005 and 2012 from 4 to 7,2 bn ZAR.2 
The Department of Science and Technology support innovation and 
technological development. South African Science and Technology policy builds 
on a quite robust framework with a National White Paper (1996), a Research and 
Development Strategy (2002) and a 10 Year Innovation Plan (2007). The Plan 
defined five ‘grand challenges’ for STI policy to engage between 2008- 2018. Two 
of these challenges were energy and global change, including climate change.  
The Department of Energy has engaged in a process of energy planning 
with the Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) that comprises most of South Africa’s 
energy technology choices for electricity generation. The plan is probably the 
most systematic sectorial approach to long term planning. The plan set out with a 
scenario for South Africa’s energy mix until 2030 that was subject of a 
consultation process. The main revisions from the consultation process were to 
include solar PV technologies and to limit the construction of coal power plants to 
2020. The objections to the nuclear plants did not find consideration. In addition 
to all existing and committed power plants (including 10 GW committed coal), 
the plan includes 9,6 GW of nuclear; 6,3 GW of coal; 17,8 GW of renewables; and 
8,9 GW of other generation sources (RSA 2011b). According to the plan, South 
Africa’s energy future will consist of a mix of nuclear and renewable energy with 
some new coal capacity. The IRP suggests installing 1000 MW renewable energy 
                                               




capacity per annum or 17,8 GW by 2030.3 However, the plan is supposedly a 
‘living plan’ that will continuously be subject to consultation and revision. Other 
sectors lack an integrated planning process, although it would be useful for the 
planning the transition towards low carbon development patterns, especially in 
transport.  
In current energy planning, South Africa’s energy future comprises coal, 
renewable energy and nuclear power. The integrated resource plan does not 
reveal details on the implementation and finance of the suggested energy mix. 
This uncertainty on the implementation side features in the other policy plans, 
too. In sum, the goals and targets are quite clearly formulated in each of the 
policy domains. However, the route to achieving these goals has not been 
concretely laid out. 














    Theme Numeric target Source 
Poverty  Reduce poverty from 39% to 0% of the 
population living below the national 




Inequality Income inequality (as measured in 











Reduce unemployment from 25% 
percent (in 2010) to 15% in 2020. 
Create 300 000 jobs in the ‘green 
economy’ with 80 000 in 
manufacturing and the rest in 
construction and infrastructural.  
400 000 until 2030.  













  Emissions 
reductions  
Reduce emission through mitigation 
actions by 34% by 2020, 42% by 
2025*  
National Climate Change 







10 000 GWh (0.8 Mtoe) renewable 
energy contribution to final energy 
consumption by 2013, to be produced 
mainly from biomass, wind, solar and 
small-scale hydro 




Mix for  
Electricity 
9,6 GW of nuclear; 16,3 GW of coal; 
17,8 GW of renewables; and 8,9 GW 
other by 2030 
Integrated Resource Plan 
(2011) 
        Source: own compilation  
 
Renewable energy is an integral part of the transition to a low carbon, climate 
resilient society in the plan (NPC 2012). The plan suggests developing exportable 
technologies and skills to deliver energy, food and water security by 2030. 
Currently, the implementation of existing renewable energy deployment 
                                               
3 A Renewables Initiative (SARI) supposedly supports the deployment and scaling up of 
renewables a part of the green economy program of DTI’s IPAP. The program is still in the 
design phase.  
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programs lacks behind. The Renewable Energy White Paper’s (DME 2003) goal 
of installing 10 000 GWH of renewable energy by 2013 will is likely fail. The 
deployment relied largely on the Renewable Energy Feed in Tariff was found 
unconstitutional by the National Treasury, because according to the Treasury’s 
interpretation it did not comply with the logic of competition. The REIPPPP 
replaced the feed-in tariff. The policy process let to delays in the implementation, 
pressure to lower the price and increased risk for the power producers.4 
INFORMATION 
The planning commission integrated most of the strategies in the plan. For the 
chapters on energy infrastructure and low carbon development, the commission 
requested six research papers. These papers were mostly on policy alignment, the 
conflict between exploring the minerals while reducing energy and carbon 
intensity, mitigation policy and infrastructure expenditure. These papers are all 
on topical solutions the planning commission had to address and some of them 
are reflected in the actual plan.  
 So far, no further research has been commissioned, to inform the 
quantifiable policy goals, to inform each of the policy options in terms of their 
costs and development contribution and on monitoring progress to reaching the 
development goals.  
COHERENCE AND COORDINATION  
How do the recent development plans relate to each other and to other sectorial 
plans? Conceptually, there are two opposing development models in the different 
plans. Whereas the IPAP and the 10 year innovation plan envisage a skills and 
innovation based transition to a knowledge economy, the energy planning in the 
NDP suggests a traditional infrastructural driven approach to economic 
development through exploitation of natural resources, especially coal and its 
export. These two opposing development concepts clash within the plan between 
chapters 4, 5 and 9. 
The main focus on infrastructure building through public works brings 
success and failure of previous public works programs to mind that have not 
contributed to reduce unemployment, poverty and inequality. Infrastructure 
development links up closely to the energy future in South Africa. The national 
development plan treats energy mostly as an infrastructural issue. The chapter on 
infrastructure presents concrete energy targets, but no real solutions. In this 
chapter the plan states that coal will remain the main energy source for South 
Africa for at least the next twenty years. The estimates of the future energy 
demand is 29 000 MW by 2030, the new two coal power plants are covering about 
4 800 MW, which leaves a big gap in electricity supply if it remains only coal 
                                               
4 Parts of this sections derive from Rennkamp, B. and A. Boyd (2012). "Technological capability 
and transfer for achieving South Africa’s low carbon development goals." Draft paper submitted 
to Climate Policy. 
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based, plans about rail capacity how to connect the diminishing coal fields in the 
central basin and the new fields in the Waterberg, to Walvis Bay in Namibia. The 
exploitation of new coal reserves requires big infrastructural road and rail 
constructions that again are supposed to create new jobs in the short-term. 
There are still question marks on the finance of capital for the six nuclear 
power stations that the South African envisages to install by 2030. The current 
cost estimates vary between 300 billion and 1,4 trillion ZAR, which are unlikely 
to come from commercial banks for such long time frames. The government will 
have to take on large part of the risk and financial burdens according to the very 
limited publicly available information on this megaproject. 
These question marks translate to the implementation of the whole energy 
plan. The treasury’s budget from tax return comprises about 700 billion ZAR per 
annum. The financial burden of the so-called ‘nuclear fleet’ will certainly 
compromise in the roll-out of the renewable energy strategy and the incentives for 
technological development in this area. Nuclear investment makes renewable 
energy more expensive. If the government cannot assure the finance on the 
market or public opposes it, the fleet might not become materialize and more 
funds can flow into decentralized energy systems.  
In terms of planning a low carbon future, there is more need for 
coordination and evidence-based, transparent decision-making considering the 
trade offs and costs between the different energy choices at the highest political 
levels. The national development plan has provided valuable inputs on trade-offs, 
pro and cons, partially in weighing options for fuel productions. This could be 
explored more substantially for other energy options with an estimation of how 
each of them can contribute to the overall development goals. 
Conclusion 
Creating a planning commission and developing a national plan has been 
certainly a big step into the right direction towards long term planning. Yet, 
South Africa is far away from efficient sustainable development planning. The 
analysis showed that sustainable, low carbon development planning falls short in 
overcoming uncertainties through information, evidence-based policymaking, 
institutional setup and political commitment.  
The development plan spells out clearly quantified overall goals. The aims 
are to reduce poverty (measured by % of population with in income below 418 
ZAR per person) from 39% to 0%, reduce inequalities from 0.7 to 0.6 as measured 
by the GINI index. Reaching these goals means overcoming severe resource, 
development and property conflicts. Reaching these goals means making choices. 
Making choices means that there will be winners and losers. The goals propose 
that the current losers, the poor population, should win. The plan remains vague 
about who is going to lose. Making choices, which might compromise the 
advantage of the current winners requires strong political commitment and 
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decision-making capacity. The political commitment to actually make these 
choices is questionable.  
The institutional set up reflects the compromised political commitment. 
The plan is a consultative plan, but no official public policy. The goals are not 
legally binding. The plan is unlikely to become a green or a white paper, as there 
is no discussion on changing its legal status. The absence of a clear institutional 
framework leads to the resources for implementation. The commission received 
initial support from the British government. So far, there are no substantial 
foreign or national resources made available for the implementation. Allocating 
national resources reflects political commitment, which has not happened yet.  
 Information has not been used strategically used to overcome the 
uncertainties, so it is quite likely that the national development just becomes 
another plan like the NSFD, which remains on paper, but without sufficient 
political commitment and institutional weight for implementation. Even as a pure 
think piece or consultative plan, the NDP lacks a solid analysis of the costs and 
benefits between different energy options. The plan provides recommendations, 
but it does not explain why the gas and coal options would be the preferred 
options over alternative energy sources. The future of the plan and its 
implementation is unclear. There is no commitment for an implementation. The 
plan sums up to a ‘wish list’ without informing feasibility checks of the policy 
goals or estimating budgets and opportunity costs of each option.  
Which option has the most beneficial poverty reducing impacts? Research 
can help to set these priorities and support the government in making legitimate 
and transparent decisions. A solid scientific basis for each of the options can help 
so that decision-making and implementing becomes as just easy as planning. It 
will be crucial for the government to understand how each of the options can 
contribute to the overall development goals of reducing poverty and inequality. It 
will be necessary to understand clearly the potential for job creation, inclusion, 
and energy security of each of the option and whether we can afford to build new 
nuclear plants, while creating a new infrastructure for coal mining and 
exploitation of new coal fields, and subsidizing the renewable energy program.  
Some research papers have informed the commission. These were background 
papers on specific issues, but there was no integrated approach to commission 
research to understanding each of the energy policy choices and their 
developmental impacts.  
Political uncertainty threatens the sustainability of the commission. It 
remains unclear, whether it will continue after the elections next year as it is very 
much personally bound to Trevor Manuel. This institutional embedding is quite 
unique. The group of experts, very loosely bound to the Presidency and 
ministerial level through Manuel, but is not to directly set up under the president.  
The coordination with other groups and plans happened through 
numerous meetings and round tables. Other departments were uncertain how to 
respond to the plan having there own sectorial plans already in place. The 
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question to ask each of the Departments would be to spell out how each of their 
strategies contributes to the overall goal of poverty and inequality reduction.  
The goals are well quantified. Yet, it would be useful to find out and 
quantify to what extent each of the sectorial plans can contribute to each of the 
poverty and inequality targets. The plan makes no reference to the previous 
framework for sustainable development.  
We can conclude that South Africa does not lack development plans and 
well-quantified development goals. The national plan has laid important 
foundations in this directions, along with the previous but neglected sustainable 
development framework and abundant sectoral plans. Yet, the risk for the 
national development plan to marginalize is very high, because of the missing 
political commitment and multiple policy uncertainties. The big bottleneck is the 
implementation and a commitment to carry the work further from the planning 
stage. Next it will be necessary to narrow down how the targets can be achieved 
and how the resource and property conflicts can be solved. Now, it will be 
necessary for researchers to inform the policy choices and their impacts on 
poverty and inequality. It will be necessary for each department to state how their 
sectoral plans contribute to the development goals. It will be necessary for 
researchers to inform what it means to eradicate poverty for each of the current 
winning coalitions. It will be necessary for citizens to understand their own 
contribution and to demand action. It will be necessary for the government to 
commit to the goals and to make urgent decisions, in favor of the poor. To 
advance sustainable, low carbon development, South African society needs these 
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